Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi
Yazarlar: Beken SAATÇİOĞLU
Konular:-
Anahtar Kelimeler:EU Conditionality,Credible Conditionality,EU Compliance,Compliance Costs,AKP
Özet: Credible EU conditionality is theorized as a central mechanism for bringing EU candidates to comply with the political membership criteria. The literature on conditionality’s domestic impact does not sufficiently explore the possibility of democratic reforms in the absence of credible conditionality. This paper tests this alternative hypothesis by studying Turkey under the rule of the AKP . It is argued that notwithstanding the falling credibility of the conditional membership perspective for the ruling actors after 2004, Turkish compliance persisted because it promised political benefits to the government. This finding highlights that domestic governments’ belief in conditionality is not a necessary condition of compliance with the EU