International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies
CEO Power and Auditor Choice
Yazarlar: Bo Ouyang, Zenghui Liu, Christine Sun
Cilt 4 , Sayı 4 , 2015 , Sayfalar -
Konular:
Anahtar Kelimeler:CEO Power Auditor Choice Agency Problem Corporate Governance Audit Quality
Özet: In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.
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BibTex
KOPYALA
@article{2015, title={CEO Power and Auditor Choice}, volume={4}, number={0}, publisher={International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies}, author={Bo Ouyang, Zenghui Liu, Christine Sun}, year={2015} }
APA
KOPYALA
Bo Ouyang, Zenghui Liu, Christine Sun. (2015). CEO Power and Auditor Choice (Vol. 4). Vol. 4. International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies.
MLA
KOPYALA
Bo Ouyang, Zenghui Liu, Christine Sun. CEO Power and Auditor Choice. no. 0, International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, 2015.