Amasya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

Yazarlar: Mehtap DOĞAN

Konular:Sosyal

Anahtar Kelimeler:Mental subject,Phenomenological method,Philosophy of mind,Consciousness,Self-consciousness

Özet: The main claim in this study is that there is a “mental subject” over and above all mental states including consciousness and self-consciousness which could be made clear just by a phenomenological method.  The ontological status of “mental subject” – that we strongly believe in its existence via our feeling of “I” - cannot be determinated by examining the nature of mental contents. Since the content of mind or consciousness is just an intentional entity of mental subject.  Content is not equal to subject and it cannot be.  In this essay, after explaining different approaches on the nature of mind and consciousness briefly, I will move onto designating the dilemmas of physicalism by focusing on the idea of “mental subject” and evaluate the counter-arguments of physicalism. Through this study, I will attempt to indicate that the strong feeling on the existence of “I” implies the existence of mental subject. The discussions and basic problems in the philosophy of mind will be reevaluated by the idea of mental subject.

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